Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, prepared by the Office of Scientific Intelligence in September 1952, asks whether flying saucer reports have national security implications. It reports that the Air Force's small ATIC group had received about 1500 official reports since 1947 and studies them only case by case. It identifies psychological warfare and air defense false alarm risks, notes silence in the Soviet press, and recommends National Security Council involvement, further research and a public information policy.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
a. The flying grouser situation contains two elements of danger which, in a situation of international tension, have national security implications. These are: (1) Psychological - With world-wide sightings reported, it was found that, up to the time of our investigation, there had been in the Russian press no report or comment, even satirical, on flying saucers, though Andre Groyko had made one horrorous mention of the subject. With a state-controlled press, this could result only from an official policy decision. The question, therefore, arises as to whether or not these sightings: (a) Could be controlled, (b) Could be predicted, and (c) Could be used from a psychological warfare point of view either affensively or defensively. The public concern with the omenaona, which is reflected in the United States press and in pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that there is a fair proportion of our population which is naturally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic. (2) Air Density - The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. We give Russia the present capability of delivering an air attack against us, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we will run the increasing risk of false alerts and the even greater danger of falsely identifying the real phantom. b. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors. From an operational point of view, three actions are required: (1) Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and electronic nuance so that in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of every place or nessile can be made.
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 5 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.