Documents / FOIA release

(EST Pub Date) CIA Public Affairs and the Drug Conspiracy Story

Central Intelligence Agency · 2006-10-23 · 6 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Central Intelligence Agency article, dated 2006-10-23 in the archive, was written by a Directorate of Intelligence officer. It reviews how CIA Public Affairs handled the 1996 San Jose Mercury-News "Dark Alliance" series by Gary Webb, which alleged CIA complicity in crack cocaine sales. The article concludes that good relations with journalists and a strong Public Affairs response kept the story from becoming a disaster. UFO coverups come up only once, as an example of fantastic allegations about CIA.

  • p. 4 …treated. ## The Role of Public Affairs Of the journalists and columnists who wrote pieces skeptical or…

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CIA connection grew until it more than tripled the coverage that gave credibility to that connection. The growth in balanced reporting was largely due to the criticisms of the San Jose Mercury-News by The Washington Post, The New York Times, $ ^{13} $ and especially The Los Angeles Times.

In its own three-part series, The Los Angeles Times debunked Gary Webb's claims and insinuations regarding the alleged role of CIA in drug smuggling, the amount of money that went to the Contras, and even such basic elements of the story as the chronology of events. Published almost exactly two months after the San Jose Mercury-News stories, The Los Angeles Times series $ ^{14} $ itself became a newsworthy story and was picked up by many media outlets across the country.

By the time the SSCI ended its first round of hearings on the matter in late October, the tone of the entire CIA-drug story had changed. Most press coverage included, as a routine matter, the now-widespread criticism of the Mercury-News allegations. DCI Deutch's much publicized "town meeting" in Watts in mid November, other than sparking a small surge of stories, ironically seemed not to have made much difference on the generally factual character of news reporting—other than possibly generating some public sympathy for the way he was treated.

## The Role of Public Affairs

Of the journalists and columnists who wrote pieces skeptical or critical of the CIA-cocaine connection, about one-third called Public Affairs before going to print. Some called to

## Because of CIA's secret history and public interest in its work, whatever CIA spokesmen say-even denials-can make news.

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check facts; many called for an official CIA comment; most called for further information.

It is in providing information that Public Affairs can best do its job. I have spoken with some CIA employees who are angry that Public Affairs "does not do more" when adverse publicity hits the papers; a few even seem to think CIA can and should write the media's stories for them. It is important to reiterate that the PAS aims above all to inform rather than to pressure or to persuade. When dealing with the media, the rule practiced by Public Affairs is to provide as much information as possible, consistent with the need to protect sensitive information, sources, and methods. Often, CIA spokesmen cannot comment. Frequently, they can say something to the media, but it can take days to figure out within the Agency what it is that can be said. For example, in order to help a journalist working on a story that would undermine the Mercury-News allegations, Public Affairs was able to deny any affiliation of a particular individual—which is a rare exception to the general policy that CIA does not comment on any individual's alleged CIA ties. But coordinating that response took time.

Because of CIA's secret history and public interest in its work, whatever CIA spokesmen say-even denials can make news. So Public Affairs fields a lot of calls from journalists up to 300 a month, if CIA is having a particularly bad time-and these

journalists tend to pay attention to the information CIA provides. CIA benefits from the good track record the PAS has with journalists for returning phone calls promptly, providing background briefings on occasion, and helping journalists as much as possible. This record gives CIA a certain level of credibility when a public relations crisis occurs.

Public Affairs cannot dictate stories to the media-nor would we want to live in a society where that was possible. CIA's relationship with the media can be an extremely sensitive matter, as demonstrated by the public flap in 1996 over the possible intelligence use of information from journalists. What CIA media spokesmen can do, as this case demonstrates, is to work with journalists who are already disposed toward writing a balanced story. Even when dealing with a breaking story that puts the Agency in a bad light, CIA Public Affairs can help the journalist with information he might not have or a perspective that might not have crossed his mind. The result is a more balanced story: better for the reporter, because the facts are right; better for CIA, because the Agency gets a fairer hearing; and better for the public, which is better informed than it otherwise might be. In a few cases, it may be possible, through simply providing information, to change the mind of a reporter whose initial inclinations toward CIA were negative but who is willing to listen to the other side of the story. The influence Public Affairs wields has its limits, but at least it exists.

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 6 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.