Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency article, dated 2006-10-23 in the archive, was written by a Directorate of Intelligence officer. It reviews how CIA Public Affairs handled the 1996 San Jose Mercury-News "Dark Alliance" series by Gary Webb, which alleged CIA complicity in crack cocaine sales. The article concludes that good relations with journalists and a strong Public Affairs response kept the story from becoming a disaster. UFO coverups come up only once, as an example of fantastic allegations about CIA.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
# Managing a Nightmare CIA Public Affairs and the Drug Conspiracy Story (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)
In the world of public relations, as in war, avoiding a rout in the face of hostile multitudes can be considered a success.
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(b)(3)(c) is in the Directorate of Intelligence.
The charges could hardly be worse. A widely read newspaper series leads many Americans to believe CIA is guilty of at least complicity, if not conspiracy, in the outbreak of crack cocaine in America's inner cities. In more extreme versions of the story circulating on talk radio and the Internet, the Agency was the instrument of a consistent strategy by the US Government to destroy the black community and to keep black Americans from advancing. Denunciations of CIA—reminiscent of the 1970s—abound. Investigations are demanded and initiated. The Congress gets involved.
But, after this surge of publicity that questions the Agency's integrity, the media itself soon begins to question the veracity of the original story. A completely one-sided media campaign is averted, and reporting on the issue becomes polarized rather than wholly anti-CIA. By one count, press stories skeptical of the charges against CIA actually begin to outnumber those giving the story credence. A review of the CIA drug conspiracy story—from its inception in August 1996 with the San Jose Mercury-News stories—shows that a ground base of already productive relations with journalists and an effective response by the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Public Affairs Staff (PAS) helped prevent this story from becoming an unmitigated disaster.
This success has to be viewed in relative terms. In the world of public relations, as in war, avoiding a rout in the face of hostile multitudes can
be considered a success. Obviously, it is not an ideal situation. We would rather promote CIA and its missions and people all the time, stopping occasionally only to correct errors in a reporter's story—but that is not realistic. As an important public relations resource book advises: $ ^{1} $
Crisis and controversy can strike any organization, regardless of its size or line of business...the rule is: Anything can happen. No organization with the remotest chance that its regimen could be upset by surprise happenings should fail to keep at least one eye open for the unexpected... No organization can expect to be immune to events that engage public attention, affect key constituencies, and arouse emotions.
With the drug conspiracy allegations, public attention was certainly engaged, as the story was carried nationwide by major and local press, TV, and radio. Emotions were aroused. The more virulent of the public attacks against CIA charged the Agency with engaging in "chemical warfare," "systematic genocide," and "attempted mass murder" against black Americans. $ ^{2} $ Were "key constituencies" affected negatively by the story? Inasmuch as the American public is the ultimate "constituency" for any element of our democratic form of government, the answer has to be yes. The Congress—a constituency for CIA due to its budget and oversight responsibilities—also became involved. Finally, the men and women who work for CIA Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 6 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.