“Nevers”34 pages
- p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
- p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
- p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
- p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to altitudes never before attained in sustained flight…
- p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover remained…
- p. 138 …William Shelton, raised an important question that had never been considered: what would happen if an…
- p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
- p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
- p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
- p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
- p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its original U-2s with the J75 engines. $ ^{106} $
Detachment C…
- p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
- p. 194 …2 program in 1974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overflight in an Agency U…
- p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
- p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on 1 May 1960 proved to be the…
- p. 223 …Responsibility for photographic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew another…
- p. 227 …Both were experienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels' fighter…
- p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
- p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in accordance with the new guidelines, never came closer…
- p. 264 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier…
- p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use, never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers. $ ^{18} $
## THE OXCART…
- p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never before used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting…
- p. 298 …above water. $ ^{29}$ As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft.
- p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
- p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine, while operating…
- p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
- p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
- p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. $ ^{59} $ The…
- p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
- p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
- p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
- p. 333 …in 1962, its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also…
- p. 348 …System-II, a communications and navigation system, never worked properly and was canceled. System-III, a…
- p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 2
U-2 detachment in formation over Nevada
Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission programmers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the detachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's determination that the U-2 was ready for deployment. $ ^{57} $
During these final tests in the spring of 1956, the U-2 once again demonstrated its unique airworthiness. On 14 April 1956, James Cunningham was sitting in his office in Washington when he received a call from Area 51 informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had experienced a flameout over the Mississippi River at the western border of Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a second flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to get the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of the Air Force, had arranged for sealed orders to be delivered to every airbase in the continental United States giving instructions about what to do if a U-2 needed to make an emergency landing.
Cunningham had the project office ask the pilot how far he could glide so they could determine which SAC base should be alerted. The pilot, who by this time was over Arkansas, radioed back that, given the prevailing winds and the U-2's 21:1 glide ratio, he thought he could reach Albuquerque, New Mexico. Within minutes Cunningham was on the phone to Colonel Geary in the Pentagon, who then had the Air Force's Assistant Director of Operations, Brig. Gen. Ralph E.