Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
  • p. 38 …off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like…
  • p. 75 …3 0 0 ^{\circ} \mathrm{F} $ at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
  • p. 80 …276 pounds heavier and delivered only 10,200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting
  • p. 89 …that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
  • p. 98 …southern Europe and then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These balloons…
  • p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
  • p. 146 …On 31 July, the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a…
  • p. 148 …space launch facility east of the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. None of the mission planners was…
  • p. 153 …of Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of Detachment A. mission 2040…
  • p. 157 Secret NOFORN Chapter 3 144 U-2s flying well within international airspace above the Black Sea…
  • p. 158 …it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000…
  • p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
  • p. 185 …Because the Bodo airfield was involved in NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area…
  • p. 225 …forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against the rebel-held areas in…
  • p. 257 …The use of peripheral missions prevented any further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea…
  • p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
  • p. 317 …2 would be flying farther out to sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs…
  • p. 350 …B B Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 11 August 1957 4039 McMurray Lahore B B…
  • p. 351 …A-2 Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 10 September 1957 4059 Hall Adana B A…
  • p. 369 …AQUILINE 304, 339-343 Arabs 256 Aral Sea 135 Arbenz, Jacobo 16 "Archangel-1" 262 "Archangel…
  • p. 371 ## Secret NOFORN Index 358 Baltic Sea 3, 303 Baltic states 104 Baltimore; Maryland 6, 9 Barents…
  • p. 373 …186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327 Caspian Sea 126 catheterized 64 cathode-ray tube 267…
  • p. 382 …23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164 Kara Sea 142 Kazakh language 135 Kazakhstan 135 Kazan', Soviet…
  • p. 385 …301 mechanical fuel totalizer/counters 68 Mediterranean Sea 114, 116, 121, 140, 142, 153 medium-range…
  • p. 393 …7 Scranton-Wilkes-Barre Airport, Pennsylvania 222 Sea of Japan 3 Seaberg, John 8-9, 12…
On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2) in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary responsibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project (AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for the security of overhead programs. This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to keep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine which contractor employees require security clearances and has had to devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing facilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has been a time-consuming and costly undertaking. $ ^{25} $

The most important aspect of the security program for the U-2 project was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for the product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions.

The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining the security of the overhead reconnaissance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the Agency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as "articles," with each aircraft having its own "article number." Similarly, the pilots were always called "drivers." In cable traffic the aircraft were known as KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise aircraft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article numbers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as KWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot). Thus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell into unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords or at worst to "articles" and "drivers," giving no indication of the nature of the program.26

Even the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement of CIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altimeters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.