Documents / FOIA release
This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“The Pentagon”10 pages
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at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project staff (by that time known as the Office of Special Activities) moved to the
Bissell reported directly to the DCI, although in reality the DDCI, Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved in the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project. Cabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly in overhead reconnaissance, made him ideally qualified to oversee the U-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the U-2 for the DCI.
## FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROJECT AQUATONE
Although Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding for the reconnaissance project, many financial details remained to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless, work on the U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29 November and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a team of 25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take them off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why to their former supervisors. The engineers immediately began to work 45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expanded to a total of 81 personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65 hours. $ ^{8} $
Kelly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft without a contract illustrates one of the most important aspects of this program: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement. Lockheed was well acquainted with the covert procurement process, having previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CIA.
Covert funding for sensitive projects simplifies both procurement and security procedures because the funds are not attributable to the Federal Government and there is no public accountability for their
DDCI Charles Pearre Cabell Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.