Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar... 23 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282... 24…
  • p. 29 …the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not mention the…
  • p. 36 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 ## British Overflight of Kapustin Yar The wide variety of programs discussed at…
  • p. 37 …its members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this…
  • p. 122 …bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US reply, sent to…
  • p. 152 …This facility was used to test radars against incoming missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, 1,400…
  • p. 156 …Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range for the first time…
  • p. 177 …overflew Kuybyshev, Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range before landing at Adana…
  • p. 351 …1959 8005 Robinsona Peshawar B B Kuybyshev, Kapustin Yar, Caucasus 5 February 1960 8009 MacArthura Peshawar…
  • p. 382 …128, 134, 197 Kandalaksha, Soviet Union 176 Kapustin Yar, Soviet Union 16, 23-24, 109, 139…
During the first half of 1955, the project staff grew slowly; many of the individuals working on overhead reconnaissance remained on the rolls of other Agency components. To achieve maximum security, Bissell made the project staff self-sufficient. Project AQUATONE had its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistic, communications, and security personnel, and, thus, did not need to turn to the Agency directorates for assistance. Funding for Project AQUATONE was also kept separate from other Agency components; its personnel and operating costs were not paid out of regular Agency accounts. As approving officer for the project, Richard Bissell could obligate funds in amounts up to $100,000; larger sums required the DCI's approval. $^{5}$

At the end of April 1955, Bissell's staff developed, and the Deputy Director for Support approved, the first table of organization for Project AQUATONE. Once operational, the project would have a

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.