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The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 19 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col…
  • p. 36 …In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the…
  • p. 106 …The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB, an RAF base also used by the USAF…
  • p. 107 …inadvertently penetrated the British radar network, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry made…
  • p. 122 …twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US…
  • p. 156 …Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a…
  • p. 166 …In November 1958, four RAF officers arrived at Detachment B at Adana, thus beginning the United…
  • p. 167 …On 7 February 1958, Bissell instructed the to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF…
  • p. 168 …MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2…
  • p. 169 …Most flights by the RAF pilots in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East…
  • p. 177 …For almost a year, the RAF pilots of Detachment B had been ready to fly over…
  • p. 194 …A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G, Edwards AFB…
  • p. 200 …approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment B. The loss of Powers…
  • p. 316 …Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great Britain. The OXCART would fly…
  • p. 332 …1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions…
  • p. 339 …Division PSAC President's Science Advisory Committee RAF Royal Air Force RFP Request for proposal SAB…
  • p. 351 …May 1960 4154 Powers Peshawar B B Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk; downed by SAM $ ^{a} $ RAF pilot
  • p. 402 …Louis 29 Watertown Strip 57 Watton RAF Base. England 156 "weather plane" cover story 179 weather…
technical means of collection. As soon as the U-2 began flying over the Soviet Union, its photographs became the most important source of intelligence available. The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of the Agency's photointerpretation capabilities, which finally resulted in the creation of the National Photographic Interpretation Center to serve the entire intelligence community.

The U-2's tremendous success as an intelligence-gathering system led the Agency to search for follow-on systems that could continue to obtain highly reliable information in large quantities. Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and also pioneered research into photosatellites. Less than a decade after the U-2 program began, the Agency's new emphasis on technical means of collection had brought about the creation of a new science-oriented directorate, which would ultimately rival in manpower and budget the Agency's other three directorates combined.

The negative aspect of this new emphasis on technology is exploding costs. The Agency's first strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2, cost less than $1 million apiece. With the U-2's successor, the OXCART, each aircraft cost more than $20 million, and the cost explosion has continued with each new generation of reconnaissance satellites.

Perhaps the greatest significance of the CIA's entry into the world of overhead reconnaissance in December 1954 was the new national policy that it signaled. Although US military aircraft had frequently violated Soviet airspace in the decade after World War II, such shallow-penetration overflights, concentrating primarily on order-of-battle data, had been authorized and controlled by US field commanders, not by the President. In the autumn of 1954, however, President Dwight D. Eisenhower—determined to avoid another Pearl Harbor—authorized the construction of a new aircraft designed solely to fly over the Soviet Union and gather strategic intelligence. Peacetime reconnaissance flights over the territory of a potential enemy power thus became national policy. Moreover, to reduce the danger of conflict, the President entrusted this mission not to the armed forces, but to a civilian agency—the CIA. From that time forward, overhead reconnaissance has been one of the CIA's most important missions.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.