The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

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Secret NOFORN
Chapter 7
219

From the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided valuable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey Pakistan played a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in Asia. Two Allies—the United Kingdom and Nationalist China—made an even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots and conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958 and conducted two important overflights of the Soviet Union in late 1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions, although their use for operational missions was considered on several occasions.

## PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM

The end of overflights of the Soviet Union reduced the importance of British participation but resulted in the addition of a new source of pilots when the focus of interest for the U-2 in its strategic intelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic of China. The United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint reconnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the mid-1950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese with the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12 years, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back large quantities of information on the development of Communist China's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such information was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist China paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2 program: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on overflights), and another three were captured.

## U-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

The low level of mission activity over the project's original target the Soviet Unionwas initially very frustrating for CIA project managers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned for the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often on hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelligence during crisis situations.

Beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with subsequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian border fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US