Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 167 Secret NOFORN become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the United States…
  • p. 174 …McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the United States…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, 1985. Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
308

USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor

advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The abandonment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the aircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pressures and competition between the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.

Throughout the OXCART program, the Air Force had been exceedingly helpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling program, provided operational facilities at Kadena, and airlifted OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and Korean operations. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA's A-12 the YF-12A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft-had helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART. Nevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet of reconnaissance aircraft, budgetary experts began to criticize the existence of two expensive fleets of similar aircraft.

In November 1965, the very month that the A-12 had been declared operational, the Bureau of the Budget circulated a memorandum that expressed concern about the costs of the A-12 and SR-71 programs. It questioned both the total number of planes required for the combined fleets, and the necessity for a separate CIA fleet. The memorandum recommended phasing out the A-12 program by September 1966 and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.