“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA... 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance... 17
The BEACON…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design... 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983).
There has also been a…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 …competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
- p. 24 …it to General Schriever, who then asked Lockheed to submit a specific proposal. In early April…
- p. 25 …Seaberg and his colleagues carefully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received in the Air Staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. $ ^{23} $
Gardner's enthusiasm for the…
- p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
- p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
- p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
- p. 40 …Council.46
## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
- p. 42 …Agency. $ ^{49} $
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
- p. 43 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 1
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials argued that the Bell X…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnaissance system…
- p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
- p. 55 …This category included maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support…
- p. 56 …to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless, work on the U-2 began as…
- p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
- p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
- p. 69 …in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier. They spotted…
- p. 70 …By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving…
- p. 74 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the exclusive province of Lockheed. $ ^{29} $
As…
- p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier, was at…
- p. 84 …article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 51 without arousing a great deal of…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the prototype "dirty…
- p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a…
- p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful J75 engine that…
- p. 199 …In the meantime Powers began working for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
- p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this. $ ^{2} $
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …2Cs for Detachment C
Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
- p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
- p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft
- p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under contract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to…
- p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were ordered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of…
- p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed employees working on a…
- p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergoing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
- p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
- p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
- p. 276 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The committee…
sufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advocacy of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department officials, however, thought that the political risks of basing the aircraft in Okinawa—which would almost certainly disclose it to the Japanese—outweighed any gains from the intelligence the OXCART might gather. On 12 August 1966, the divergent views were presented to President Johnson, who upheld the 303 Committee's majority opinion against deployment for the time being. $ ^{56} $
The CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order to test the aircraft's ECM systems in a hostile environment. On 15 September the 303 Committee considered and rejected this idea on the grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba "would disturb the existing calm prevailing in that area of our foreign affairs." $ ^{57} $
With operational missions still ruled out, proficiency training remained the main order of business. This led to improvements in mission plans and flight tactics that enabled the detachment to reduce the time required to deploy to Okinawa from 21 days to 15. Records continued to fall to the OXCART. On 21 December 1966, a Lockheed test pilot flew an A-12 for 16,408 kilometers over the continental United States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speed of 2,670 kilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at speeds as low as 970 kilometers per hour). This flight set a record for speed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft. $ ^{58} $
Two weeks later, on 5 January 1967, an A-12 crashed after a fuel gauge malfunctioned and the aircraft ran out of fuel short of the runway. Pilot Walter Ray ejected but was killed when he could not become separated from the ejection seat. To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an SR-71 was missing and presumed down in Nevada. This loss, like the three preceding crashes, did not result from difficulties caused by high-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems inherent in any new aircraft.
Proposals for OXCART operations continued to surface, and in May 1967 the CIA forwarded a detailed request to the 303 Committee to use the OXCART to collect strategic intelligence about a new