Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 58 …in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at Burbank, California, known as the Skunk Works. $ ^{10} $ Lockheed…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 51 without arousing a great deal of…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank to Area 51. By 18 November 1959, the…
  • p. 296 …not test the OXCART aircraft at its Burbank facility, where the runway was too short and…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from Burbank to…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at Area 51 two days later…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
  • p. 372 …201,205,209,236,293 BUORL 22 Burbank, California 45 Secret NOFORN Burke, William 168,170…

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Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
294

yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said the issue should be reviewed again in February. $ ^{40} $

One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the individual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying, very fast objects. $ ^{41} $

By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that surfacing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be able to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he announced the successful development of an "advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet." $ ^{42} $

President Johnson had spoken of the A-11 rather than the Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the public was the Air Force's YF-12A interceptor, a project that had already been canceled. $ ^{43} $ Following the President's announcement, two of

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.