Documents / FOIA release
This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“RAF”18 pages
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
The second new version of the OXCART was another reconnaissance aircraft. In December 1962 the Air Force ordered six "reconnaissance/strike" aircraft, which were designed to conduct high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance of enemy territory after a nuclear strike. This new aircraft differed from other A-12 versions in that it was longer, had a full-blown two-seat cockpit, and carried a large variety of photographic and electronic sensors. The additional weight of all this equipment gave the Air Force craft a slower maximum speed and a lower operating ceiling than the Agency's A-12. In August 1963, the Air Force added 25 more aircraft to this contract, for a total of 31. $ ^{38} $
## THE QUESTION OF SURFACING A VERSION OF THE OXCART
As the funds being spent on Air Force versions of the OXCART increased dramatically, the Defense Department became concerned that it could not offer any public explanation for these expenditures. At the same time, Agency and Defense Department officials recognized the growing danger that a crash or sightings of test flights could compromise the program. This led the Defense Department in late 1962 and early 1963 to consider surfacing the Air Force's interceptor version of the A-12 to provide a cover for OXCART sightings or crashes and an explanation for the rise in Air Force spending. Some journalists had also become aware of the aircraft's existence, raising concern that the secret would eventually come out in the press. Agency officials remained reluctant to reveal the existence of any version of the A-12, and the issue soon came to the attention of the PFIAB. James Killian and Edwin Land strongly opposed disclosing OXCART's existence, and in January 1963 they presented their views to President Kennedy at a meeting attended by DCI McCone and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Killian, Land, and McCone succeeded in persuading the President and Secretary of Defense to keep the OXCART's existence a secret for the time being.
Later that year supporters of the idea of surfacing the OXCART found a more powerful argument for their proposal—the need to disseminate the supersonic technology that had been developed for the Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.