Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA... 13 Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance... 17 The BEACON…
  • p. 6 …260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair... 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design... 270 Efforts To…
  • p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983). There has also been a…
  • p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
  • p. 23 …competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
  • p. 24 …it to General Schriever, who then asked Lockheed to submit a specific proposal. In early April…
  • p. 25 …Seaberg and his colleagues carefully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June…
  • p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
  • p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received in the Air Staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and…
  • p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. $ ^{23} $ Gardner's enthusiasm for the…
  • p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
  • p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
  • p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
  • p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
  • p. 40 …Council.46 ## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
  • p. 42 …Agency. $ ^{49} $ Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
  • p. 43 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the…
  • p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
  • p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
  • p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials argued that the Bell X…
  • p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
  • p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnaissance system…
  • p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
  • p. 55 …This category included maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support…
  • p. 56 …to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless, work on the U-2 began as…
  • p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
  • p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
  • p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
  • p. 69 …in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier. They spotted…
  • p. 70 …By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving…
  • p. 74 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the exclusive province of Lockheed. $ ^{29} $ As…
  • p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
  • p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
  • p. 81 …runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier, was at…
  • p. 84 …article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 51 without arousing a great deal of…
  • p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
  • p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
  • p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
  • p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
  • p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
  • p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the prototype "dirty…
  • p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
  • p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a…
  • p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful J75 engine that…
  • p. 199 …In the meantime Powers began working for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
  • p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this. $ ^{2} $ One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to…
  • p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
  • p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
  • p. 230 …2Cs for Detachment C Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft
  • p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under contract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to…
  • p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were ordered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of…
  • p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed employees working on a…
  • p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergoing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20…
  • p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
  • p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
  • p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
  • p. 276 Secret NOFORN Chapter 6 Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The committee…

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to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials decided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No. 11 to the contract reduced from 12 to 10 the number of A-12s, for a total cost of $161.2 million. $ ^{27} $

The cancellation of these two A-12s was offset by an Air Force order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F-108A Rapier interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the assistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 aircraft, based on the A-12 design but modified to carry a second crewman and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF-12A) was designed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to 100 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cutting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A project; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. $ ^{28} $

Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle. In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy to assist in funding the J58's development. After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy aircraft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel Command that had originally financed the J58 engine, authorized the transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keeping the OXCART's head above water. $ ^{29}$ As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.