Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack... 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …this new advisory body. $ ^{29} $ ## The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their headquarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the codename…
  • p. 32 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …the reconnaissance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. ## PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …137 Beacon Hill 17-19,21,24,31-32,331-332 BEACON HILL Report 17,19…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
280

OXCART pilot suit

(B-120) characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures, but high in cost. As strong as stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much. Obtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a quality suitable for fabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because methods for maintaining good quality control during the milling of titanium were not fully developed. Up to 80 percent of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation had to be rejected. It was not until 1961, when company officials were informed of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, that problems with the titanium supply ended. Even after sufficient high-quality titanium was received, Lockheed's difficulties with the metal were not over. Titanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication broke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly line production was not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well above original estimates. $ ^{22} $

The high temperatures that the OXCART would encounter also necessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort because the inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. To save

"OXCART Story," p. 5 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, p. 33 (TS Codeword).

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.