Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber—the Canberra—built by…
  • p. 19 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col…
  • p. 22 …high-altitude performance of the B-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted…
  • p. 36 …The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with RollsRoyce Avon-109 engines and gave it long…
  • p. 37 …altitude flight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57. $ ^{41} $ ## The Intelligence Systems Panel…
  • p. 80 …production was needed to power specially configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first…
  • p. 122 …a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin…
  • p. 175 …2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two aircraft cruised along the Soviet border…
  • p. 372 …310, 313, 321, 327, 329, 332, 333 Canberra 5, 9, 23-24, 67, 109, 117, 162…
  • p. 401 …General 61 oxygen mask 62 RB-57D Canberra 162 Third Air Force 89 US deterrent force…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
280

OXCART pilot suit

(B-120) characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures, but high in cost. As strong as stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much. Obtaining sufficient quantities of titanium of a quality suitable for fabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because methods for maintaining good quality control during the milling of titanium were not fully developed. Up to 80 percent of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation had to be rejected. It was not until 1961, when company officials were informed of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, that problems with the titanium supply ended. Even after sufficient high-quality titanium was received, Lockheed's difficulties with the metal were not over. Titanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication broke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly line production was not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well above original estimates. $ ^{22} $

The high temperatures that the OXCART would encounter also necessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort because the inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. To save

"OXCART Story," p. 5 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, p. 33 (TS Codeword).

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.