Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber—the Canberra—built by…
  • p. 19 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col…
  • p. 22 …high-altitude performance of the B-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted…
  • p. 36 …The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with RollsRoyce Avon-109 engines and gave it long…
  • p. 37 …altitude flight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57. $ ^{41} $ ## The Intelligence Systems Panel…
  • p. 80 …production was needed to power specially configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first…
  • p. 122 …a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin…
  • p. 175 …2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two aircraft cruised along the Soviet border…
  • p. 372 …310, 313, 321, 327, 329, 332, 333 Canberra 5, 9, 23-24, 67, 109, 117, 162…
  • p. 401 …General 61 oxygen mask 62 RB-57D Canberra 162 Third Air Force 89 US deterrent force…
characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also preferable in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section than the Lockheed A-12. $ ^{15} $

Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6

	Lockheed A-12	Convair KINGFISH
Speed	Mach 3.2	Mach 3.2
Range(total)	4120nm	3400nm
Range(at altitude)	3800nm	3400nm
Cruising Altitude
Start	84500ft.	85000ft.
Midrange	91000ft.	88000ft.
End	97600ft.	94000ft.
Cost summary(for12 aircraft without engines)	$96.6 million	$121.6 million

Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost overruns and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security. Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared by the Agency.

Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection panel remained concerned about the A-12's vulnerability to radar detection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for reducing the A-12's radar cross section by 1 January 1960. On 14 September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.