Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to altitudes never before attained in sustained flight…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover remained…
  • p. 138 …William Shelton, raised an important question that had never been considered: what would happen if an…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its original U-2s with the J75 engines. $ ^{106} $ Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …2 program in 1974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overflight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on 1 May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photographic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew another…
  • p. 227 …Both were experienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels' fighter…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in accordance with the new guidelines, never came closer…
  • p. 264 Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use, never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers. $ ^{18} $ ## THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never before used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting…
  • p. 298 …above water. $ ^{29}$ As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft.
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine, while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. $ ^{59} $ The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …in 1962, its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also…
  • p. 348 …System-II, a communications and navigation system, never worked properly and was canceled. System-III, a…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs. . . The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order. Five planes could be delivered for operations within two years.

The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircraft having normal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altitude over target is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. $ ^{23} $

Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false impression that most Air Force officials supported the Lockheed design. In reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the process of choosing the modified version of the Martin B-57 and the new Bell X-16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.

During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Frederick Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282 because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials asked Strong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hired Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282. $ ^{24} $

Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career before he joined the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell studied at the London School of Economics for a year and then completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During World War II, Bissell had managed American shipping as executive officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war, he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the end of 1951, when he became a staff member of the Ford Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953, when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United

Philip Strong

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.