Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar... 23 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282... 24…
  • p. 29 …the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not mention the…
  • p. 36 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 ## British Overflight of Kapustin Yar The wide variety of programs discussed at…
  • p. 37 …its members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this…
  • p. 122 …bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US reply, sent to…
  • p. 152 …This facility was used to test radars against incoming missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, 1,400…
  • p. 156 …Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range for the first time…
  • p. 177 …overflew Kuybyshev, Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range before landing at Adana…
  • p. 351 …1959 8005 Robinsona Peshawar B B Kuybyshev, Kapustin Yar, Caucasus 5 February 1960 8009 MacArthura Peshawar…
  • p. 382 …128, 134, 197 Kandalaksha, Soviet Union 176 Kapustin Yar, Soviet Union 16, 23-24, 109, 139…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
244

Fiscal Year	Overflights
Total	104
1962	18
1963	17
1964	13
1965	30
1966	10
1967	14
1968	2

## Peripheral Missions by Detachment H

Detachment H did not cease its activities following the termination of overflights of mainland China. Its next U-2 mission took place on 18 May 1968. This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in accordance with the new guidelines, never came closer than 20 miles to the Chinese coast. All future Detachment H missions against the PRC also conformed with this restriction but were still the target of interception attempts by PRC MiG-21s or hastily erected SAM sites on offshore islands. The use of peripheral missions prevented any further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea from unknown causes shortly after taking off to start a mission on 5 January 1969. Another pilot was killed on 24 November 1970 in a crash during a routine training mission. $ ^{66} $

The level of activity gradually increased during the remaining years of Project TACKLE, as can be seen in the table on page 245.

The U-2s flying these missions were generally equipped with the B or the newly designed 48-inch H cameras to obtain oblique photography and with various signal-intelligence-gathering systems. Beginning in May 1971, Project TACKLE began using a new communications-intelligence collection package known as LONG SHAFT. This system was used on 32 occasions through 12 December 1973, when the LONG SHAFT collection program ended.

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.