The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

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week later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet offensive in South Vietnam. The 303 Committee (the new name for the Special Group after 1964) decided on 1 February 1968 to suspend a group of overflights scheduled for February and called for mission-by-mission approval "during this period of tension." The committee approved one additional overflight of southern China, which was flown by Detachment H on 16 March 1968, and two overflights of Cambodia, carried out on 27 March and 3 April 1968 by Detachment G in its first operations since early 1966. These three missions turned out to be the last overflights by U-2s in the Far East. By this time U-2 flights over the PRC had become so dangerous that the State Department opposed further overflights, and on 10 April 1968 the 303 Committee decided not to approve any mission that would fly closer than 20 miles from the coast of China.

Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
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One reason why Detachment H's overflights were stopped was the steady increase in the PRC's ability to track and engage U-2s, as evidenced by its success in downing five U-2s. By 1968 PRC radars along the coast opposite Taiwan were keeping a close watch on U-2 activity from the T'ao-yuan base and actively tracked U-2s as soon as they became airborne. The U-2s then had to face a growing PRC air defense system that not only consisted of SA-2 missiles but also the fast and high-flying MiG-21. The PRC's MiG-21 pilots had become adept at the power-zoom technique and were threatening almost every U-2 mission. The risks to U-2s now seemed too great. $ ^{65} $

The decision to end Asian overflights was also rooted in the Johnson administration's change in its whole approach to the war in Indochina in the spring of 1968. On 31 March 1968, the President limited the bombing of North Vietnam in order to improve the chances for peace talks. The end of flights over the People's Republic of China was viewed as another way to improve the peace process.

During its six years of overflight operations, Project TACKLE had been extremely active, staging a total of 104 flights over the People's Republic of China (see table, page 244). These missions had brought back huge amounts of data about the PRC but not without a price: five Project TACKLE aircraft had been downed by the PRC, with two of the pilots killed and the other three captured (although later returned). In addition, five other Nationalist Chinese pilots had been killed in training accidents.