Documents / FOIA release
This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Mission Control”28 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
207
defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction, the study recommended "maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." $ ^{13} $ Because the danger posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford (USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over Cuba at 1 in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight over San Cristobal.
As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force representative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it would be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mishap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel Ledford's opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were much more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiving familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting, McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the San Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots. $ ^{14} $
Two days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot should not be used until he had received adequate training. The conversation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission, the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba, the DOD representatives called DCI McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.