Documents / FOIA release
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974
Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR
This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Nevers”34 pages
- p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
- p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
- p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
- p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to altitudes never before attained in sustained flight…
- p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover remained…
- p. 138 …William Shelton, raised an important question that had never been considered: what would happen if an…
- p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
- p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
- p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
- p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
- p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its original U-2s with the J75 engines. $ ^{106} $
Detachment C…
- p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
- p. 194 …2 program in 1974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overflight in an Agency U…
- p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
- p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on 1 May 1960 proved to be the…
- p. 223 …Responsibility for photographic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew another…
- p. 227 …Both were experienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels' fighter…
- p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
- p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in accordance with the new guidelines, never came closer…
- p. 264 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier…
- p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use, never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers. $ ^{18} $
## THE OXCART…
- p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never before used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting…
- p. 298 …above water. $ ^{29}$ As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft.
- p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
- p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine, while operating…
- p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
- p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
- p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. $ ^{59} $ The…
- p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
- p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
- p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
- p. 333 …in 1962, its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also…
- p. 348 …System-II, a communications and navigation system, never worked properly and was canceled. System-III, a…
- p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
206
that had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost certainly not operational." The Special Group then requested the preparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time for its next meeting on 9 October.
In the meantime, CIA U-2s continued the reconnaissance program that the Special Group had approved in September. In early October two peripheral missions—3098 along the southeastern coast on 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see map on page 203)—discovered an additional five SAM sites. This brought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of surface-to-surface missiles.
Evidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the September and early October missions had avoided was the most likely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). On 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in particular to the need for renewed coverage of western Cuba:
The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29, coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means that there may well be many more sites now being built of which we are unaware. Ground observers have in several recent instances reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo coverage. $ ^{12} $ Attached to this memorandum was a list of targets, with the area around San Cristobal at the top.
On 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's recommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the "suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This mission was also designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites that was thought to be most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2 Not linked to a story yet.
About this file
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.