“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA... 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance... 17
The BEACON…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design... 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983).
There has also been a…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 …competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
- p. 24 …it to General Schriever, who then asked Lockheed to submit a specific proposal. In early April…
- p. 25 …Seaberg and his colleagues carefully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received in the Air Staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. $ ^{23} $
Gardner's enthusiasm for the…
- p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
- p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
- p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
- p. 40 …Council.46
## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
- p. 42 …Agency. $ ^{49} $
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
- p. 43 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 1
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials argued that the Bell X…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnaissance system…
- p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
- p. 55 …This category included maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support…
- p. 56 …to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless, work on the U-2 began as…
- p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
- p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
- p. 69 …in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier. They spotted…
- p. 70 …By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving…
- p. 74 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the exclusive province of Lockheed. $ ^{29} $
As…
- p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier, was at…
- p. 84 …article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 51 without arousing a great deal of…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the prototype "dirty…
- p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a…
- p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful J75 engine that…
- p. 199 …In the meantime Powers began working for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
- p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this. $ ^{2} $
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …2Cs for Detachment C
Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
- p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
- p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft
- p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under contract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to…
- p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were ordered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of…
- p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed employees working on a…
- p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergoing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
- p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
- p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
- p. 276 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The committee…
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 4
center that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency and the military services. The report further recommended that the CIA be placed in charge of the new center. Ignoring Air Force claims that it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the report's recommendation, and, on 18 January 1961, National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8 established the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Henceforth, the director of NPIC would be designated by the DCI and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and the deputy director would come from one of the military services. The first director of NPIC was Arthur S. Lundahl, head of the CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division. $ ^{55} $
One additional major change in the U-2 program in the years immediately following the May Day incident—although not directly related to the loss of Powers' U-2—was the departure of Richard Bissell from the CIA and the subsequent reorganization of the Agency's reconnaissance and scientific activities. The roots of Bissell's downfall went back to 1 January 1959, when he became Deputy Director for Plans and decided to place all Agency air assets in the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnaissance projects (the U-2 and its two proposed successors, the OXCART aircraft and the reconnaissance satellite). The previously independent Development Projects Staff became the Development Projects Division (DPD) of the DDP and now controlled all Agency air operations, including air support for covert operations. As a result, U-2s were occasionally employed for gathering intelligence to support DDP operations in addition to their primary mission of gathering strategic and tactical intelligence.
Although the reorganization made sense in terms of increasing the efficiency of Agency air operations, the use of the U-2 to support covert action disturbed Bissell's backers among the scientists advising Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, especially James Killian and Edwin Land. They were concerned that Bissell was becoming too involved in covert action and was not able to devote sufficient time to the overhead reconnaissance program. Then came the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, which discredited Bissell with the Kennedy administration in general and the two scientists in particular. Later that year, Bissell lost another important source of support when Allen Dulles resigned as DCI in November 1961. During his final