Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to altitudes never before attained in sustained flight…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover remained…
  • p. 138 …William Shelton, raised an important question that had never been considered: what would happen if an…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its original U-2s with the J75 engines. $ ^{106} $ Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …2 program in 1974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overflight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on 1 May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photographic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew another…
  • p. 227 …Both were experienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels' fighter…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in accordance with the new guidelines, never came closer…
  • p. 264 Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use, never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers. $ ^{18} $ ## THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never before used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting…
  • p. 298 …above water. $ ^{29}$ As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft.
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine, while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. $ ^{59} $ The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …in 1962, its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also…
  • p. 348 …System-II, a communications and navigation system, never worked properly and was canceled. System-III, a…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 4

The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evidence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of 1 May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with testimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and his commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board; the results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to undergo; and the evidence provided by photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent with Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical. He asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check Johnson's assessment of the photographs of the U-2. The Air Force quickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings. McCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted Powers' testimony—a report by the National Security Agency (NSA) that suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude and turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being downed—and ordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on 1 March for another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by NSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days later, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2 Affair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA. $ ^{44} $

Although all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted properly, they did not release many of their favorable findings to the public, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior from sensational press reports and statements by public figures who were not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers' actions while in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the impact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI McCone on 6 March 1962: "Don't you think he is being left with just a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is supposed to do, why leave it hanging?" $ ^{45} $ Doubts about Powers did remain in the public mind because he received no public recognition for his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.