“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA... 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance... 17
The BEACON…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design... 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983).
There has also been a…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 …competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
- p. 24 …it to General Schriever, who then asked Lockheed to submit a specific proposal. In early April…
- p. 25 …Seaberg and his colleagues carefully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received in the Air Staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. $ ^{23} $
Gardner's enthusiasm for the…
- p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
- p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
- p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
- p. 40 …Council.46
## Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
- p. 42 …Agency. $ ^{49} $
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
- p. 43 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 1
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials argued that the Bell X…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnaissance system…
- p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
- p. 55 …This category included maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support…
- p. 56 …to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless, work on the U-2 began as…
- p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
- p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
- p. 69 …in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier. They spotted…
- p. 70 …By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving…
- p. 74 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the exclusive province of Lockheed. $ ^{29} $
As…
- p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's chief test pilot, Tony LeVier, was at…
- p. 84 …article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 51 without arousing a great deal of…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the prototype "dirty…
- p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a…
- p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful J75 engine that…
- p. 199 …In the meantime Powers began working for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
- p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this. $ ^{2} $
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …2Cs for Detachment C
Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
- p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
- p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft
- p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under contract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to…
- p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were ordered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection of…
- p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed employees working on a…
- p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergoing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
- p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
- p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
- p. 276 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The committee…
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 4
167
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as summarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed that the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness." $ ^{15} $
A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mission had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 February 1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacArthur at the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratam Missile Test Range, headed northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from this mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts did discover a new Soviet bomber, dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'. $ ^{16} $
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate continued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as many as 100 missiles. The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be found. Additional U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February, President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 missions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence of Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consider a resumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one mission to be flown during the month of March. The President's continued restrictions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memorandum to the National Security Council on 1 March 1960 asserting that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein. $ ^{17} $