Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to altitudes never before attained in sustained flight…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover remained…
  • p. 138 …William Shelton, raised an important question that had never been considered: what would happen if an…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its original U-2s with the J75 engines. $ ^{106} $ Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …2 program in 1974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overflight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on 1 May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photographic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew another…
  • p. 227 …Both were experienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels' fighter…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in accordance with the new guidelines, never came closer…
  • p. 264 Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft carrier…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use, never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers. $ ^{18} $ ## THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never before used in camera systems. These included the use of a reflecting…
  • p. 298 …above water. $ ^{29}$ As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft.
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine, while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. $ ^{59} $ The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …in 1962, its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also…
  • p. 348 …System-II, a communications and navigation system, never worked properly and was canceled. System-III, a…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the MIG-17, had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet, $ ^{6} $ Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet fighters. Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World. This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber—the Canberra—built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra had made its first flight in May 1949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 kilometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance), which began flying in March 1950. $ ^{7} $

At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Martin Aircraft Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomber. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that was stressed to less than the standard military specifications. Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000 feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declining fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modified Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photograph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries.

Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance

Richard S. Leghorn

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.