Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 6 …U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet...216 U-2Cs for Detachment C...217 U…
  • p. 170 …Detachment C mainly collected high-altitude weather data, although it also flew two missions over Tibet…
  • p. 229 …One important area of DDP activity during this period was Tibet. In March 1959, the PLA…
  • p. 231 Chapter 5 Lhasa, Tibet, November 1959 Although the plane was equipped with a camera, it carried…
  • p. 232 …Flights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet and western China continued during the first half…
  • p. 245 …Khli when it staged four sorties over Tibet from 29 September to 10 November 1963. In…
  • p. 398 …301-302, 304, 307 Thule, Greenland 172 Tibet 157, 216, 219, 232 Time 99 TIME STEP…

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Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning. $ ^{14} $

As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determined to obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the missile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelligence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. At this time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was extremely large and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only be deployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed railroad tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles, therefore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the

Saratov Engels Airfield, 6 December 1959

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.