Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials that…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six days before the Wright Air Development…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II. New York: William Morrow, 1986. . The Soviet…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 4
160

Launch of Sputnik, 4 October 1957

Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an ICBM capable of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles. These statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this same month of December, the first attempt to launch the new US Titan ICBM failed. In reality, all of the Soviet statements were sheer propaganda; they had encountered difficulties with the SS-6 ICBM, and the program was at a standstill. As a result, there were no ICBM launches from Tyuratam between 29 May 1958 and 17 February 1959, a space of almost nine months. $ ^{2} $

To conceal the difficulties in their missile program, Soviet leaders continued to praise its alleged successes. At the beginning of February 1959, Khrushchev opened the Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow by claiming that "serial production of intercontinental ballistic rockets has been organized." Several months later Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky stated that these missiles were capable of hitting "precisely any point" and added, "Our army is equipped with a whole series of intercontinental, continental and other rockets of long, medium and short range." When asked at a press conference to comment on Malinovsky's statement, President Eisenhower replied, "They also said that they invented the flying machine and the automobile and the telephone and other things. . . Why should you be so respectful of this statement this morning, if you are not so respectful of the other three?" Nevertheless, the Soviet statements were taken at face value by most Americans, including many members of the intelligence community.

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.