Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 19 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col…
  • p. 36 …In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the…
  • p. 106 …The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB, an RAF base also used by the USAF…
  • p. 107 …inadvertently penetrated the British radar network, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry made…
  • p. 122 …twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US…
  • p. 156 …Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a…
  • p. 166 …In November 1958, four RAF officers arrived at Detachment B at Adana, thus beginning the United…
  • p. 167 …On 7 February 1958, Bissell instructed the to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF…
  • p. 168 …MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2…
  • p. 169 …Most flights by the RAF pilots in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East…
  • p. 177 …For almost a year, the RAF pilots of Detachment B had been ready to fly over…
  • p. 194 …A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G, Edwards AFB…
  • p. 200 …approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment B. The loss of Powers…
  • p. 316 …Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great Britain. The OXCART would fly…
  • p. 332 …1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions…
  • p. 339 …Division PSAC President's Science Advisory Committee RAF Royal Air Force RFP Request for proposal SAB…
  • p. 351 …May 1960 4154 Powers Peshawar B B Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk; downed by SAM $ ^{a} $ RAF pilot
  • p. 402 …Louis 29 Watertown Strip 57 Watton RAF Base. England 156 "weather plane" cover story 179 weather…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 3

launched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the west-to-east jet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed at an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000 feet, and then reversed direction. One of the key arguments that convinced the President to approve the project was Quarles's claim that the balloons' "chance of being detected is rather small and their identification or shootdown practically nil." $ ^{96} $

Release of the balloons took place from an aircraft carrier in the Bering Sea on 7 July 1958. Nothing was heard about them until 28 July, when Poland sent a note protesting the overflight of a US-made, camera-carrying balloon that had fallen to earth in central Poland. The loss of this balloon was because of human error. Each balloon was equipped with a timing device that would cause it to drop its camera and film payload after crossing the target areas. An Air Force technician aboard the aircraft carrier had calculated that the balloons should cross the Eurasian landmass in about 16 days. Thus, he adjusted regulators aboard the balloons to cause automatic descent after 400 hours aloft. When bad weather delayed the launch for three successive days, however, the technician forgot to reset the timing devices. As a result, one payload fell into Poland. None of the three WS-461L balloon payloads was recovered. $ ^{97} $

The Polish protest was quickly followed by a Soviet note protesting the balloons' violation of the Soviet Union's airspace. Several months later, the Soviets placed the US balloon and photographic equipment on display in Moscow for the world's press. President Eisenhower was angry that the Defense Department's assurances that the balloons would not be detected had proved false. Even worse, one of the balloons had been recovered by the Poles because the Air Force had disobeyed his instructions for the balloon project. When the Air Force had proposed the use of timers to bring down the balloons at the end of the mission, Eisenhower had said no, fearing that a malfunction could cause the balloons to come down prematurely. Furious at the Air Force's insubordination, the President ordered General

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.