“The Advance”35 pages
- p. 6 …267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design... 270
Efforts To Reduce the A-12's Radar…
- p. 7 …319
Advances in Technology... 320
Cooperation With the Air Force... 321
Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
- p. 11 …the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A-12 OXCART, but this advanced…
- p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
- p. 32 …the development of advanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommendations called for the…
- p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with advances in nuclear…
- p. 36 …Because of advanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelligence, the overflight did not…
- p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
- p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
- p. 76 advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Ruseckas then developed a complex…
- p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
- p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
- p. 152 …Saryshagan later became the center for the development of the Soviet Union's advanced antiballistic missile…
- p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the number of obsolescent…
- p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
- p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
- p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
- p. 236 supplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most advanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The…
- p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
- p. 250 Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
## Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H
Demand for overhead photography of the…
- p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM equipment. $ ^{60} $
- p. 265 …the result of technological advances. The initial order for eight of the new version of the…
- p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
- p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B program…
- p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
- p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
- p. 307 …which he announced the successful development of an "advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which…
- p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
- p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The abandonment of the OXCART…
- p. 325 …As a result, when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced…
- p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
- p. 333 …The OXCART is an even better example of the technological advances generated by the CIA's…
- p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
- p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and…
- p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the miniaturization of electronic technology would make possible the development…
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 3
Operation SOFT TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment B staged one more overflight on 10 September 1957, when a U-2 piloted by William Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted its successful overflight of the ICBM impact site at Klyuchi, and October saw the final two overflights of Detachment A. After these missions, penetration overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two, in 1959; and three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this period, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of flights along Soviet border areas that occasionally penetrated short distances inside the border, but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of authorizing "deep penetration" overflights, which invariably brought protests from Moscow.
The border flights took place under tight controls. Beginning in the fall of 1957, all messages from Washington to Adana giving coordinates for flights along the Soviet border contained the statement: "This is not a penetration overflight" and warned about flying too close to Soviet borders. The Soviets even attempted to shoot down