Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber—the Canberra—built by…
  • p. 19 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col…
  • p. 22 …high-altitude performance of the B-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted…
  • p. 36 …The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with RollsRoyce Avon-109 engines and gave it long…
  • p. 37 …altitude flight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57. $ ^{41} $ ## The Intelligence Systems Panel…
  • p. 80 …production was needed to power specially configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first…
  • p. 122 …a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin…
  • p. 175 …2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two aircraft cruised along the Soviet border…
  • p. 372 …310, 313, 321, 327, 329, 332, 333 Canberra 5, 9, 23-24, 67, 109, 117, 162…
  • p. 401 …General 61 oxygen mask 62 RB-57D Canberra 162 Third Air Force 89 US deterrent force…
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 1

By 1949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained off from the outside world, and the Soviet military carried out its planning, production, and deployment activities with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities bomber forces, ballistic missiles, submarine forces, and nuclear weapons plants were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory policies, was also largely an unknown factor.

Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition, the Soviet Union made its conventional means of communication—telephone, telegraph, and radio-telephone—more secure, thereby greatly reducing the intelligence available from these sources. The stringent security measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents using covert means to communicate intelligence, travelers to and from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and report their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping methods, and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other methods were available.

## Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance

Although at the end of World War II the United States had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To obtain information about Soviet scientific progress, the intelligence community established several programs to debrief German scientists who had been taken to the Soviet Union after the end of the war but were now being allowed to leave. $ ^{2} $

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.