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The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 6 …267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design... 270 Efforts To Reduce the A-12's Radar…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force... 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 11 …the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A-12 OXCART, but this advanced…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 32 …the development of advanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommendations called for the…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 36 …Because of advanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelligence, the overflight did not…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Ruseckas then developed a complex…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 152 …Saryshagan later became the center for the development of the Soviet Union's advanced antiballistic missile…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the number of obsolescent…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 236 supplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most advanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 ## Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM equipment. $ ^{60} $
  • p. 265 …the result of technological advances. The initial order for eight of the new version of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …which he announced the successful development of an "advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The abandonment of the OXCART…
  • p. 325 …As a result, when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …The OXCART is an even better example of the technological advances generated by the CIA's…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the miniaturization of electronic technology would make possible the development…

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Secret NOFORN
Chapter 3
134

The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK KNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not wish to locate another one there and denied the request. The Agency then turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japanese Government received no notification of the proposed deployment because at that time it had no control over activities involving US military bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early 1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on the base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded Japan. $ ^{80} $

Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after several aircraft and pilots flew to Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force radar order-of-battle reports and NSA studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East, with antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those in the western Soviet Union, was relatively ineffective. To take advantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first, on 7/8 June (the aircraft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on 19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined every third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars, but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the detachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/16 September 1957 achieved excellent results. The radar-deception devices proved ineffective, however, as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed by five fighters. $ ^{81} $

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.