Documents / FOIA release

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; the U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1900-01-01 · 406 pages · text by OCR

This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar... 23 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282... 24…
  • p. 29 …the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not mention the…
  • p. 36 Secret NOFORN Chapter 1 ## British Overflight of Kapustin Yar The wide variety of programs discussed at…
  • p. 37 …its members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this…
  • p. 122 …bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US reply, sent to…
  • p. 152 …This facility was used to test radars against incoming missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, 1,400…
  • p. 156 …Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range for the first time…
  • p. 177 …overflew Kuybyshev, Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range before landing at Adana…
  • p. 351 …1959 8005 Robinsona Peshawar B B Kuybyshev, Kapustin Yar, Caucasus 5 February 1960 8009 MacArthura Peshawar…
  • p. 382 …128, 134, 197 Kandalaksha, Soviet Union 176 Kapustin Yar, Soviet Union 16, 23-24, 109, 139…
Secret NOFORN

Chapter 3

Colonel Goodpaster with President Eisenhower

take it as a certainty that no pilot would survive... and that although they would know where the plane came from, it would be difficult to prove it in any convincing way."

CIA assurances that the U-2 would probably not be detected, and that a crashed U-2 could not be traced back to the United States, helped overcome the President's worries about overflights. The most important reason why President Eisenhower decided to send reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union, however, was the urgent need for accurate intelligence to confirm or disprove claims of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet Bison bomber in the spring of 1954 had been followed by reported sightings of more than 30 of these bombers in the spring and summer of 1955 (in reality these were sightings of the same group of 10 aircraft that circled around out of sight and made several passes during a Soviet air show). Soon members of Congress were calling for investigations into the relative strength of the US and

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.