Documents / FOIA release
This is a 1992 CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, originally classified Secret NOFORN and approved for release in 2013. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and the two aircraft it developed, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. The history covers the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers and later operations in Asia and Latin America. It also includes a section on U-2s, UFOs and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Cooper”11 pages
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 2
88
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh the political liabilities of the international protests. CIA officials became concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights, including those by the U-2, which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore, DDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February 1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the "additional political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and overflights, thus increasing the difficulties of policy decisions which would permit such operations in the future." 73
In addition to its concern for the future of the U-2 program, the Agency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon overflights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the Free Europe Committee—a covert Agency operation based in West Germany—used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern Europe.
## AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded secret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration, DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be told about the project. On 24 February 1956, Dulles met with Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell, the ranking members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcommittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some members of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a result of the senators' recommendation that the senior members of the House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and Clarence Cannon. Official Congressional knowledge of the U-2 project remained confined to this small group for the next four years. The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcommittee did not receive a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960. $ ^{74} $ Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.