Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency file contains memoranda to the Director of Central Intelligence from H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, dated October 1952. They find that the Air Force's Air Technical Intelligence Center explains flying saucer reports one case at a time, which is not enough to resolve the problem as a whole. The memos warn of two national security dangers, mass psychological panic and air defense vulnerability, and recommend that the National Security Council be briefed and that research begin.
Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.
The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected both in the United States press and in the pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that a fair proportion of our population is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic. b. Air Vulnerability - The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. The U.S.S.R. is credited with the present capability of delivering an air attack against the United States, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial ones. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we will run the increasing risk of false alerts and the even greater danger of falsely identifying the real as phantom. 7. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors. 8. From an operational point of view, three actions are required: a. Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and electronic phantom so that, in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of enemy planes or missiles can be made. b. A study should be instituted to determine what, if any, utilization could be made of these phenomena by United States psychological warfare planners and what, if any, defenses should be planned in anticipation of Soviet attempts to utilize them. c. In order to minimize risk of panic, a national policy should be established as to what should be told the public regarding the phenomena. ___ 9. Other intelligence problems which require determination are: a. The present level of Soviet knowledge regarding these phenomena. b. Possible Soviet intentions and capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the detriment of United States security interests.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 7 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.