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Apollo 11 Technical Crew Debriefing, Volume 1 (scan)

NASA via ibiblio · 1969-07-31 · 251 pages · text by OCR

This is Volume 1 of NASA's Apollo 11 Technical Crew Debriefing, dated July 31, 1969. The Mission Operations Branch of the Flight Crew Support Division at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston prepared it, and it was originally classified Confidential. In it Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins go phase by phase through suiting, launch, powered flight, Earth orbit and lunar surface activities. They comment on suit fit, vibration, checklists, lunar dust, footing and poor sleeping conditions in the lunar module. A section titled Visual Sightings appears in the table of contents.

Open the PDF at page 96 Original source ↗

“Nevers”31 pages

  • p. 15 …Alpha never came off zero throughout the launch, and I wondered if they were operating. 3…
  • p. 42 …The price you pay for that is that you never know whether it's going to…
  • p. 48 …34 S-IVB SLINGSHOT MANEUVER Now, we never saw that. It seems like the attitude they…
  • p. 51 …thought out, and we were never rushed and we were never behind. ALDRIN Well, our positioning…
  • p. 57 …This had never come up before. The ground suspected that it was due to thermal characteristics…
  • p. 71 …That never was corrected throughout the flight. We saw this condition through the rest of the…
  • p. 77 …I never absolutely caught it mal-functioning. I think those suspicions mostly had to do with…
  • p. 78 …Now, we never went into that mode that Apollo 10 discovered of pointing the plus X…
  • p. 79 # CONFIDENTIAL ## 6.24 RADIATORS COLLINS We never flowed through the secondary radiators because the primary worked…
  • p. 91 …We recognized that we had never done a new P52 to an option 1. We are…
  • p. 93 …They followed it but were never able to catch up with it. It was suggested to…
  • p. 112 …the state vector from which we could never recover. The procedure that we used was one…
  • p. 114 …I never could get into a position to check the downlock on the fourth gear. I…
  • p. 116 …I never was too concerned about what was going on inside the LM, but it did…
  • p. 122 …We had never done that in the SIM's. Later on I was a little confused…
  • p. 139 …We never powered it up and left it alone. ARMSTRONG A lot of people didn't…
  • p. 141 …It was impossible to bring it back, and I never saw the LM again throughout the
  • p. 142 …I never turned on any gimbal motors, but I did feel that I could light the…
  • p. 143 …area and all that; but again I never saw the LM, so for future flights, I…
  • p. 150 …The simulator was never able to simulate accurately what you would see through the Sun. We…
  • p. 164 …Buzz called lunar contact, but I never saw the lunar contact lights. ## ALDRIN I called contact…
  • p. 177 …We never were able to get into that area to look at those rocks in detail…
  • p. 180 …All these items took a little bit of time, a little bit of discussion, which never…
  • p. 186 …It had never been redesigned, and it was usually ascribed to the fact that all the…
  • p. 187 …It suffices to say that we never did understand what was required to enable good COMM…
  • p. 188 …The times when we actually operated the PLSS was done always in the chamber and never…
  • p. 206 …I'd never observed that problem on the ground, and I can't account for it…
  • p. 210 …I tried to choose various types of hard rocks out there so that, if we never…
  • p. 215 …Of course, there's nothing to compare it with, because I'd never seen them before…
  • p. 246 …This was a never-ending ## CONFIDENTIAL
  • p. 247 ## CONFIDENTIAL battle to obtain just a minimum level of sleeping conditions, and we never did it…
# CONFIDENTIAL

7. 8 ADEQUACY OF CONTACT WITH GROUND OPERATIONAL

SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR LOI

ALDRIN	Before the burn, I had noticed a difference in the A and B N2's. I didn't record which one was higher. They were well within what we consider nominal; it stuck in my mind that there was a difference. It wasn't too surprising when the ground called us after the burn and said that they had observed tank B nitrogen had dropped down somewhat during the time of the burn. I think it dropped to 1900.
ARMSTRONG	The values I have are B — 1950 psi and A — 2250 psi postburn. The helium was 1500 psi. Those came up a little bit after the temperature stabilized.
ALDRIN	We'll talk a little more about that. Evidently there was not any particular leak. It might have been a thermal condition that one tank had been exposed to.
ARMSTRONG	The flow through that particular solenoid valve could have been greater than emphasized.
ALDRIN	We started that one on B and then went to A. I don't know if that would be any explanation.
ARMSTRONG	I can't think offhand why that would affect it. The only thing I think about is the size of the orifice through which the gas is passing or the chamber size that, somehow, it was feeding...

# CONFIDENTIAL

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 251 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.