Documents / Report
Air Intelligence Division Study No. 203 is a Top Secret analysis dated 10 December 1948, prepared jointly by the USAF Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of Naval Intelligence. It reviews about 210 reported flying object incidents and concludes that some type of flying object has been observed, though its identity and origin cannot be determined. The study treats domestic devices or Soviet aircraft based on German flying-wing designs as possible explanations. It also summarizes selected sighting and radar reports.
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the Russian oil situation (regardless of estimated oil reserves) is quite different from that in the U.S. For example, U.S. oil industry is prepared to turn out tremendous quantities of highly fractionated petroleum products, while the U.S.S.R. cannot reasonably approach such capabilities. This consideration dictates different solutions on fuels for propulsion in the two countries and in turn, dictates the direction taken in development of jet motors or the use of other propulsive devices. We must therefore, arrive at the conclusion that any Soviet device which may have made its appearance over the U.S. as described, would possess unusual performance characteristics which, in all probability, would include unusual range. The possibility that they could have been launched at fairly close range should not be discarded. 4. POSSIBLE REASONS OR TACTICS FOR THE USE OF SOVIET UNCONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT OVER THE U.S. Predicated on all the foregoing assumptions, Soviet unconventional aircraft may have been flown over the U.S. for one, all, or a combination of the following reasons: a. TO NEGATE U.S. CONFIDENCE IN ATOM BOMB AS THE MOST ADVANCED AND DECISIVE WEAPON. If the objects have been used in a propaganda sense, it would be reasonable to assume that the Soviets would choose first to frighten pro-American nations in Europe with the appearance of a radically new weapon to counteract the ability of the U.S. to obtain full propaganda effectiveness with the atom bomb. It will be remembered that strange objects first appeared over the Scandinavian countries in 1946. The objects observed there had unusual range and unusual performance characteristics. As this demonstration over the Scandinavian countries occurred the U.S. was making a vigorous campaign for the economic and political alignment of these nations with other pro-American Western European nations. When these incidents subsided, strange flying objects began to be observed at an increasing rate over the U.S. The conclusion on this point is that flying objects may have been used to frighten both European nations and the U.S. by the appearance of a new device, and that failure to identify such a Soviet object would give them invaluable indication that U.S. development is far behind that of the Soviets. Except for this indication, it is believed that the use of the objects to promote fear has been worthless in that the U.S. public has tended to characterize these incidents entirely as hallucinations by "crack pots", misidentification of conventional objects, or that they represent a secret American project which should not be publicized. Any fear that might result from Soviet use will come only by a discovery that the objects have been Soviet aircraft and that they involve radical developments which are in advance of our own accomplishments. b. FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE. It is possible that the Soviets have employed the flying objects for the collection of photographic intelligence or the mapping of certain areas in the U.S. The evasive action employed by all objects sighted indicates not so much an attempt to avoid being sighted, as an attempt to prevent disclosure of the exact type of flying craft and its mission. The sighting of objects over the U.S. has been most intense in Eastern and Western Coastal States. In addition, sightings of flying objects have been made near Oak Ridge, Tenn., Las Cruces, N. M., and in the general area of the Hanford Works in Oregon. Generally, sightings have not been made over what we consider strategic industrial areas. The reason for this might be either that the flying objects have been observed only enroute to or from missions over these more concentrated strategic areas, or that the Soviets obtained sufficient information during their World War II liaison with U.S. industry to satisfy their intelligence requirements and have a more active requirement for information on industries and areas which were not available to them during World War II contacts. This is of interest in connection with the sightings near Oak Ridge, Las Cruces, and in the general area of the Hanford Works since these establishments were not, and are not, accessible to Soviet collectors of photographic intelligence. c. TEST OF U. S. DEFENSES. It is possible that the use of Soviet flying objects over the U.S. is intended only to determine the ability of the U.S. defenses to spot foreign aircraft. This would be of extreme importance to the U.S.S.R. In the event that a one-way all-out attack of Soviet strategic bombers is planned. Ability to operate over the U.S. uninhibited at a time when the U.S. is supposedly re-arming and putting great stress on defenses would provide valuable information on which to base estimates for probability of success in bombing strategic objectives in the U.S.
Report, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 19 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.